The problem of solving for the equilibrium prices and allocation of a market economy has large informational and computational requirements [4] . In this work we apply the idea of abstraction to market equilibrium computation. We construct a simplified model of a market (aka an abstraction), solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and then lift the answers back to the original market. We derive analytic bounds for the error in the computed equilibrium as a function of abstraction quality, describe two methods of abstraction that can be useful in practical problems, and evaluate our approach on real datasets.
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The problem of solving for the equilibrium prices and allocation of a market economy has large informational and computational requirements [4] . In this work we apply the idea of abstraction to market equilibrium computation. We construct a simplified model of a market (aka an abstraction), solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and then lift the answers back to the original market. We derive analytic bounds for the error in the computed equilibrium as a function of abstraction quality, describe two methods of abstraction that can be useful in practical problems, and evaluate our approach on real datasets.
Computing optimal allocations subject to constraints has been a problem of interest since the inception of modern economic theory. Early applications included trying to use linear programming to plan the entire Soviet economy [5, 6] . Modern market designers, with slightly less grand visions, also use market allocation based-algorithms such as competitive equilibrium from equal incomes, CEEI [8] , to allocate courses at business schools [1] or split chores between roommates [3] .
Motivated by these examples, we will focus on the canonical case of linear Fisher markets. In Fisher markets we have a set of divisible items to be allocated and a set of individuals who may receive the items. Individuals have a total budget of money and valuations for each item. Formally, a market equilibrium consists of a price for each item and an allocation such that 1) individuals cannot improve their utility by using their budgets to purchase a different set of items (given the prices) and 2) the total demand for each item (i.e., the total amount allocated across buyers) is equal to the supply.
All linear Fisher markets have an equilibrium that maximizes Nash social welfare which can be computed by solving the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program [2] . However, scaling market equilibrium computation to large markets requires solving two major challenges. First, one needs access to large amounts of information (e.g., every person's valuation for every item or item combination). Second, one needs access to enough compute power to solve the related convex or mixed integer program which, even if it is theoretically solvable in weakly polynomial time [7] , becomes unwieldy for large markets (e.g., thousands or millions of buyers).
In this paper, we consider solving for equilibria of large markets by introducing the notion of market abstractions. We use the information we have to create an abstraction (a simplified model of the market), solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and then project the answers to the original market. We provide a general set of results that bound various quantities (regret, envy, Pareto optimality, Nash social welfare) of buyers if we use the allocation/prices derived from the abstraction rather than the true equilibrium.
Turning to practice, we focus on two abstraction methods of particular interest. The first uses techniques from matrix completion to infer valuations for person-item pairs that we may not have access to. We refer to this as low-rank markets. The second consists in reducing the size of the market (and thus computational burden) by replacing groups of buyers (or items) with a representative buyer or representative item. It then solves for equilibrium in the representative case and splits the allocation of each representative among the individuals/items it represents. We refer to this as representative market equilibrium. We show that this abstraction reduces the computational complexity and can be efficiently parallelized. We put forward two ways of performing the lift to the original market, a proportional and a recursive version, and discuss the tradeoffs of each one.
We apply these abstraction methods, which can be used together, to real datasets and evaluate the quality of solutions at various levels of abstraction. One of the data sets, which we have collected, may have independent interest: it consists of the willingness-to-pay for different household items for several thousand people. In all computations, we found that the equilibria have quite decent properties even in very coarse abstractions.
For more details, we refer the reader to the full paper at https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06230 .
